

EFAK XXI

EESTI FILOSOOFIA AASTAKONVERENTS
/ ESTONIAN ANNUAL PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE

28-29 Mai / May 2026

Tallinna Tehnikaülikool / Tallinn University of Technology

TEESIDE RAAMAT / BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Simon Barker

Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu

& Jaanika Puusalu

Research Centre of Internal Security Institute, Estonian Academy of Security Sciences

AI and Educational Goods: A Leap into Not Knowing

In 2025, Estonia announced the national AI Leap education programme, central to which is the integration of generative-AI learning applications across the national curriculum. In this paper, we draw on social epistemology and critical theory to elucidate a tension between this policy and the fundamental components of democratic education.

In section one, we introduce a hierarchy of democratic educational goods, whereby any adequate national curriculum must impart to its students: (i) (shared) knowledge and understanding, (ii) shared democratic norms and values, and (iii) the intellectual/interpersonal skills to engage in life and participate in democratic society.

In section two, we briefly explain how generative-AI works and highlight two properties inherent to any generative-AI application:

Bespoke-ness Responses to user inputs can be unique and are typically relevant

Divergence Any input could have easily had a response with different content

Importantly, these two features are interdependent: applications can be modified to reduce divergence, but doing so reduces their capacity for bespoke-ness. And vice-versa. In section three, we explain why divergence is incompatible with acquiring the three kinds of

educational goods and, therefore, this dependence constrains the potential contribution of generative-AI applications to democratic national curricula.

Olle Blomberg

University of Helsinki & University of Gothenburg

Agent-Regret, We-Guilt and Moral Luck

I argue that an individual can fittingly feel guilt as a group member—we-guilt—in light of a group’s wrongdoing even if she is not personally at fault. This helps give substance to the idea that a group can be non-distributively blameworthy. My argument draws on Bernard Williams’s discussion of “agent-regret”. Agent-regret is a pained emotional response that represents the agent’s self—who she is—as significantly connected to harm or wrongdoing but without her being at fault. Agent-regret tends, like guilt, to motivate the agent to approach victims and engage in repair. We-guilt is a related emotional response that can correctly represent a wrongdoing of one’s group as ‘our’ violation of a moral requirement that ‘we’ are subject to, and that motivates the agent to engage in repair of the one’s groups relation to victims of the wrongdoing or to the moral community.

Evita Bukonte

University of Tartu

Hermeneutical Injustice in the Transgender and Gender Diverse Patient- Doctor Relationship

Based on seven interviews with transgender and gender diverse (TGD) people who have received gender affirming care, I apply and analyse instances of epistemic injustice in their experiences. Coined by Miranda Fricker, hermeneutical injustice is an injustice that arises from a lack of collective interpretive resources, which makes it difficult or even impossible for a speaker's experience to be understood by a hearer. In some cases, the lack of a concept makes it difficult for a speaker to interpret their own experience.

This paper reveals that hermeneutical injustice is applicable to TGD patientdoctor experiences. The application of various forms of epistemic injustice also illustrates how they propagate and are not isolated cases.

Maria Victoria Ruiz Calderon

University of Glasgow / University of Tartu

Deep-Time Nuclear Communication/ Deterrence, Memory, and the Risk of Aesthetic Inversion

This presentation examines the limits in designing a message for nuclear waste repositories intended to warn over deep time. Two contrasting strategies are analysed: the deterrent architecture proposed in the United States for sites such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and the memorytransmission approach developed in France for the Cigéo project by the French National Agency for the management of radioactive waste (ANDRA). The American model relies on a layered message including hostile architectural markers designed to evoke danger and discourage intrusion. The French model, by contrast, focused in a long-term memory transmission and preservation of knowledge, framing the site as a form of intergenerational. Despite these strategical differences, both face the same philosophical problem: the instability of meaning across millennia. Drawing on Kant's account of the sublime, the paper identifies the risk of aesthetic inversion, whereby intensions of repel may later be reinterpreted as monumental, fascinating, or historically valuable once the immediate perception of danger is normalised. Over time, sites designed as warnings may be recontextualised as cultural or historical landmarks. The analysis therefore argues aesthetics openness to reinterpretation, its very capacity to endure and attract attention, makes it an unreliable medium for stable normative messages across deep time.

Keywords: deep-time communication, nuclear semiotics, aesthetic inversion, interpretive instability.

Pietro Chiericoni

University of Pavia

Cultural Influences on the Neural Processing of Emotion

While culture has long been recognized as shaping emotional states, its role in emotional processing has received less attention. This paper argues that cultural background influences not only emotional experience but also emotionally charged perception itself. To perceive emotionally charged objects can have different meanings from an empirical perspective, raising questions about how the notion should be understood philosophically. On the one hand, it connects to debates on the scope of perceptual content; on the other, it relates to discussions on cognitive penetration. The first part of the paper clarifies this notion by integrating insights from these two strands of literature.

The paper then turns to cross-cultural research on emotion perception. Earlier work often emphasized the universality of emotional processes, paying little attention to cultural variation. Since the 1990s, however, cultural influences on emotions have become widely

acknowledged. Despite this shift, most studies still focus on how culture shapes the phenomenological experience of higher level emotional states. By contrast, this paper discusses neuroscientific evidence showing that culture modulates activity in large-scale brain networks involving sensory cortices and emotion-related regions. Together with behavioral findings, this evidence suggests that culturally-influenced cognitive states can penetrate perception and alter how stimuli are represented.

Wolfgang Damoser

University of Vienna

Public Philosophy Meets Pop Culture: A Metaphilosophical Analysis

Over the past decades, public philosophy has gained significant momentum. It encompasses diverse formats (e.g., podcasts or media appearances) that extend the boundaries of traditional academic philosophy. Although heterogeneous in methodology and practice, public philosophy has increasingly become an object of scholarly reflection concerning its goals, standards and societal impact.

A particularly promising subfield lies at the intersection of philosophy and popular culture. Since the early 2000s, this area has grown considerably, with major academic publishers launching extensive book series on “philosophy *and* popular culture.” This largely instrumental approach, notably introduced by William Irwin, presents popular culture as a means of introducing philosophy to broader audiences. More recently, the “pop culture *as* philosophy” approach argues that certain cultural works raise philosophical questions and thus constitute a genuine mode of doing philosophy.

These forms of engagement reveal differing assumptions about the conceptions of philosophy underlying Philosophy–Pop-Culture approaches and broader debates on public philosophy, calling for systematic metaphilosophical conceptualization. This presentation outlines the early conceptual stages of an ongoing PhD project and welcomes critical feedback on its overall research design.

Alex Davies, Martin Aher, Kurmet Kivipõld, Maria Reile & Nikolai Shurakov

Tartu Ülikool

How Contracts Shape the Meaning of Law

Semantic underdetermination is widespread: the standing, context-invariant meaning of a text typically underdetermines its semantic content on any given occasion of use. Yet texts are routinely used to convey stable content across contexts — a fact that raises the question of

how this is possible (Cappelen & Lepore; Davies; Fish). We investigate this problem as it arises in a specific and practically important case: law interpreted not by trained lawyers but by parties to a contract in which the law appears. Our case is Estonia's Road Conditions Ordinance, incorporated into contracts between the Transport Administration, local governments and road maintenance firms. Drawing on interviews with practitioners and a programme of controlled experiments, we investigate how the contractual relationship shapes interpretation of the ordinance by the parties to it. The broad finding is that contractual roles drive interpretations apart — buyers and sellers converge on different readings of identical text, for reasons rooted in their opposing financial positions. But various features of the contractual relationship counteract this divergence (including the fairness of different interpretations of the law). The results shed light on the meaning of a semantically-underdetermined text can be standardized across contexts.

Melike Durmaz

Department of Philosophy, Yeditepe University (Istanbul, Turkey).

Lexis over Logos: Speech and Disclosure in Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition

This presentation aims to examine why Hannah Arendt, in *The Human Condition*, deliberately employs the concept of *lexis* when discussing action and speech, taking into account its usages in Ancient Greek thought. In the history of philosophy, discussions of speech and reasoning have most often foregrounded the concept of *logos*. However, Arendt chooses the term *lexis*, which, although derived from the same root as *logos*, occupies a distinct semantic field. While *logos* frequently denotes principle, rational argument, or the structured form of thought, *lexis* refers more specifically to the manner in which a thought is articulated—its mode of expression. The way a thought is expressed simultaneously renders visible the identity of the one who speaks. This capacity of *lexis* to disclose the agent constitutes a central element of Arendt's understanding of action and the political realm. The inseparable bond between action and speech can thus be understood in relation to the disclosure of the “who” through *lexis*. In this context, the first part of the presentation will examine the use of *lexis* in Ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, and clarify its distinction from *logos*. The second part will discuss, based on the etymological meaning of *lexis*, how, in Arendt's conception of action, speech functions to make the ‘who’ of the agent visible.

Basel Hammoda

Department of Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology

& Howard Haines

Entrepreneurship Department, Central Michigan University

Artificial Intelligence and Entrepreneurial Agency: Rethinking the Development of Effectual Expertise

Artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in entrepreneurial decision-making and activities. Entrepreneurship research has therefore begun to view AI as a development that may reshape entrepreneurial action itself (Obschonka et al., 2025; Shepherd & Majchrzak, 2022). This raises a key theoretical question: if entrepreneurial action becomes increasingly mediated by AI, how does this affect the development of entrepreneurial expertise over time? Entrepreneurship depends not only on information but also on human agency and heuristics. Recent research shows that even advanced AI systems do not eliminate Knightian uncertainty because entrepreneurial environments involve unknown possibilities rather than computable risks (Townsend et al., 2025; Ramoglou et al., 2025). Human interpretation and judgment therefore remain central to entrepreneurial action. AI may reshape early entrepreneurial stages most strongly as it can lower cognitive barriers of novice entrepreneurs for opportunity exploration and business modeling (Winkler et al., 2023; Shepherd & Majchrzak, 2022). However, this support may also reduce the experiential processes through which entrepreneurial heuristics normally develop. Using effectuation as a lens, the paper conceptualizes AI as an effectual tool, compensating for the expertise gap between novice and expert entrepreneurs. It proposes a temporal paradox: AI may democratize entrepreneurial participation while simultaneously altering how entrepreneurial expertise develops.

Juhan Hellerma

Tartu Ülikool / Berliini Vabaülikool

Kontroll ja resonants tehisaru ajastul

Viimaste kümnendite filosoofilistes ja humanitaarteaduslikes aruteludes on laialt kritiseeritud antropotsentrilist maailmapilti, mida peetakse üheks tänapäevase ökoloogilise kriisi juurpõhjuseks. Samal ajal on järjest enam päevakorda kerkinud küsimus inimese rollist tehnoloogilises maailmas, kus tehisintellekti areng seab kahtluse alla mitmed seni inimlikuks peetud võimed. Niisiis liigub arutelu justkui vastandlikes suundades. Ühelt poolt nähakse vajadust vähendada inimese domineerimist looduse üle, teiselt poolt terendab hirm, et inimene kaotab oma senise positsiooni, muutudes tehisagentide maailmas üleliigseks ja asendatavaks. Kuidas on võimalik, et tahame inimkeskset maailmapilti ületada ja kardame sellest samal ajal ilma jääda?

Ettekandes arutlen, kuidas seda näilist vastuolu lahendada, kasutades sotsioloog Hartmut Rosa eristust kontrolliva ja resonantse maailmasuhte vahel. Ökoloogilises diskursuses levinud antropotsentrismi kriitika keskmes on inimkonna kasvav mõju looduskeskkonnale, mis väljendub võimekuses seda üha efektiivsemalt eksploateerida ja manipuleerida. Tehisaru arenguga seoses esile kerkinud ohutunne puudutab aga midagi muud. Siin on kaalul väljavaade, et tehismaailma pealetung võib välja juurida inimliku spontaansuse ja loovuse, millel põhineb vastasmäng ja kõnelus maailmaga. Just seda kvaliteeti – kuulamise ja vastamise dünaamikat – nimetab Rosa resonantsiks, eristades seda järjekindlalt objektistavast

kontrollikirest. Niisiis väidan, et Rosa pakutud raamistikule toetudes on võimalik täpsustada, millises tähenduses inimkeskne maailmapilt tõepoolest väärrib kõigutamist ning millises tähenduses tuleks seda siiski alal hoida.

Kelly Hrupa

Tallinna Ülikool

Teleoloogiline kindlus ja haavatav agentsus

Kriitiline fenomenoloogia näitab, et haavatavust kujundavad ühiskondlikud normid, võimusuhted ja marginaliseerimise vormid (nt Petherbridge 2016; Pulkkinen 2020; Boubilil 2024; Gilson 2024; Gündoğdu 2025). Ent need käsitlused ei uuri haavatavust agentsuse praktilise maailmahorisondi muutusena, mis seiskab tavapäraseid tegutsemist stabiliseerivad kogemusstruktuurid ja kujundab praktilist sidusust. Tavaagentsust kannab teleoloogiline kindlus: koordinaatsioonid tegude pingutuse, tagajärgede ja ajalisuse vahel, mille toel saab subjekt tegutseda läbikukkumist lakkamatult tematiseerimata (Moran 2021). Teleoloogiline kindlus moodustab tegutseja jaoks niisiis reflektsoonieelse tähenduse maailma praktilisest usaldusväärsest. Kehastumusest tingituna on agentsus aga asetatud ja katkestatav, kuivõrd siin on maailm subjektile alati antud enamana, kui ta saab korruga enda kanda võtta ja tegudega hallata (vrd Wehrle 2020). Just niisugust ühismõõdutust puhverdab teleoloogiline kindlus, ilmutades maailma tegusid lõimiva horisondina, kus äpardumised näivad korrigeeritavatena, tegude tagajärjed proportsionaalsetena ning teod tähenduslikeks tegevuskavadeks koonduvatena. Sellegipoolest võib teleoloogiline kindlus agentsuses nõrgeneda või katkeda (vrd Yang 2025). Kindluse katkedes tungib aga tegutsemises esile haavatavus ja takistab tuleviku toimimist tegusid lunastava horisondina, samas kui ühismõõdutuna paistev maailm nõuab jätkuvalt tegusid ja reageeringuid. Agentsuses ilmnevat haavatavust saab neutraliseerida, hallata või integreerida. Viimasel juhul on tulemuseks haavatav agentsus, mida püüan ettekandes lähemalt kirjeldada

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Silvana Hultsch

Philosophy department, Uppsala University, Sweden

Keep Calm and Embrace the Normativity - Accounts of Moral Progress and their Normative Commitments

Some philosophers who theorize about societal moral progress avoid or minimize normative commitments or understate the extent to which such accounts rely on normative commitments. In this paper, I explore how normatively committed a plausible account of societal moral progress must be. First, I argue that accounts of societal moral progress, as well as the progress claims most central to the debate, are necessarily normative since societal moral progress is desirable. Such accounts, by nature, hinge on a normative view of what counts as a *relevant improvement*. Second, I argue that contemporary accounts that avoid, minimize, or understate the relevance of an underlying normative view have resulted in incomplete or vague accounts, compromising their pragmatic virtue in evaluating cases of social change, as they fail to render plausible verdicts about even core cases of societal moral progress. They also contribute to what I call the *problem of disguised normativity*: the pretense of neutrality conceals unexamined normative commitments, creating conceptual confusion and potential for ideological misuse. Ultimately, such accounts cannot escape introducing a substantive normative view, even if implicit, which collapses any such project into an exercise in ordinary normative ethics.

Christos Iliopoulos

Deree – The American College of Greece, Athens

Radical Political Theology, an Elective Affinity between Anarchism and Christianity

This paper examines a very specific field of Political Theory, that of Political Theology, by bringing together political anarchism with Christianity. The former is to be defined/described by anarchist theory and practice, and the latter is deriving from the Bible, Old and New

Testament alike. The framework for the affinity between these two poles will be Michael Lowy's adaptation of the concept of elective affinity, and, in particular, its four levels of manifestation: 1. Simple affinity, 2. Convergence, 3. Fusion, and 4. Creation of a new figure. Moreover, this affinity may be explored by using each one of these poles as a methodological framework for reading the other, highlighting the libertarian and authoritarian elements of Christian tradition, as well as the deeply rooted theological concepts within anarchist literature and tradition. The paper includes historical case studies where these two theories and practices have intertwined, stressing the synergies as well as the tensions between them. The Catholic Worker Movement, Liberation Theology in Latin America, The Diggers in 17th-century England, Anabaptists in the Middle Ages are some representative examples. In addition, the perspective of an active fusion of Anarchism and Christianity (levels 3 and 4 of elective affinity), in the form of both a theology-infused anarchism and an anarchist-inspired theology, may answer the question of how it is possible for contemporary Christian religious groups to promote radical political practices in the context of direct democracy and activism, and what the impact of such repertoire may be in today's political fermentations, worldwide.

Keywords: Christianity, Anarchism, Elective Affinity, Radical Political Theology

Savvas Ioannou

University of Cyprus

Panmentalism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Chalmers (1995) has presented the hard problem of consciousness: we have no satisfactory explanation of why and how consciousness arises from the physical. A suggested way to solve the hard problem of consciousness is to endorse panpsychism (see Brogaard (2016), Chalmers (2016a, 2016b), Goff (2017), Seager (2016), Strawson (2008)). Some panpsychists have argued that the only way to close the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and the physical is to claim that macro-consciousness arises from micro-consciousness. However, Nagasawa (2021) has argued that panpsychism faces an ingredient problem: we know almost nothing about the nature of microphenomenal properties, and as a result, we cannot refer to microphenomenal properties to explain how macrophenomenal properties arise.

I will propose an alternative theory of the mind that addresses how the ingredient problem and the hard problem of consciousness can be resolved. I call this theory 'panmentalism' because it holds that micro-objects possess an ability to be conscious, but they are not conscious because there is no mechanism to activate this ability. Conscious experiences exist only at the macro-level. At the micro-level, there are microphysical properties and microabilities to be conscious, and these properties ground conscious macro-experiences.

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Roomet Jakapi

Tartu Ülikool

Kas idee substantsist või lõpmatusest on kujutluspilt? Locke'i ideedeteooria tõlgendused

Oma suurteoses „Essee inimarust“ (1689) kasutab John Locke terminit „idee“ (ingl *idea*) väga avaras tähenduses, osutades nii meeletaju ja sisekaemuse kui ka mõtlemise ja mälu vahetutele objektidele vaimus (ingl *mind*). See laialivalguv sõnakasutus on lugejatele peavalu valmistanud juba sajandeid. Siinse ettekande fookuses ei ole ideed kui meeletajus antud objektid, mille olemasolu eeldamine tekitab teada-tuntud tunnetusteoreetilisi probleeme. Keskendutakse hoopis neile ideedele, mis on mõtlemise koostisosadeks. Küsimus on selles, kas viimased on Locke'i käsitluses olemuslikult ja vältimatult kujutluspildid või on vähemalt osa neist mittepildilised vaimsed esitused. Ettekandes vaadeldakse mõlema tõlgenduse pooldajate argumente ja analüüsitakse sääraseid piirjuhtumeid nagu substantsi idee ja lõpmatuse idee. Peamine järeldus seisneb selles, et tõlgendajate senine debatt on tuginenud liiga kitsale arusaamale kujutlusvõimest. Ettekande eesmärgiks on näidata, kuidas praegused mõistelised eristused kujutluse filosoofias võimaldavad Locke'i ideedeteooriat ammendavalt käsitleda. Otsustav on siin eristus kujutlemise kui tegevuse ja kujutluspiltide kui esituste vahel.

Tvrtko Jolić

Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

Revolutions and Moral Progress: Normative Limits and Historical Possibilities

Revolutions are sudden and radical transformations of social, political, or economic systems, often accompanied by violence and destruction. For that reason, initiating a revolution may seem ethically problematic. Yet history suggests that even violent revolutions can produce morally significant outcomes. The French Revolution contributed to the realisation of human and civil rights. This helps explain why Kant regarded it as a sign of moral progress. In this presentation, I examine whether revolutions can be understood as instruments of moral progress. First, I discuss Kant's claim that revolution cannot be morally justified and contrast it with Locke's more favourable view. I then turn to Allen Buchanan's naturalistic theory of revolution, which rejects abstract just-war frameworks and instead analyses the empirical dynamics of revolutionary movements. In the final part, I argue that revolutions cannot be seen as instruments of moral progress in a normative-legal sense. However, they may function as conditional instruments of moral progress at the epistemological and historical-institutional levels by fostering the public articulation of moral ideas and contributing to long-term processes of moral learning and institutional change.

Liisi Keedus

Tallinna Ülikool

„Tugevad saadavad korda, mida suudavad ja nõrgad taluvad, mida peavad?": Thukydides kui esimene poliitikafilosoof

„(T)e teate ju sama hästi kui meie, et õigluse üle otsustatakse inimestevahelises vaidluses võimult võrdsete vahel ja, tugevad saadavad korda, mida suudavad ja nõrgad taluvad, mida peavad“ (Thukydides, *Pelopennesose sõda*, 89) – on ilmselt viimaste kuude korratuim klassikaline tsitaat. Thukydidest peetakse nii poliitilise ajaloo kui poliitrealismi vaarisaks, ent märksa harvem asetatakse see pelgalt näiliselt – nagu näiteks on väitnud Leo Strauss – jõupoliitiline mõttekild *Pelopennesose sõja* laiemasse poliitikafilosoofiliste vaadete ja väidete konteksti. Kui lugeda teost tervikuna, ilmneb, et Melose dialoog on osa rangelt komponeeritud arutlusest Ateena impeeriumi hävingust ja Sparta tõusust, ning poliitikast üldisemalt – nii et neid ei allutata ei moraalsele idealismile ega mehhaanilisele jõuloogikale. „Õiglane“ (*dikaion*) – poliitikafilosoofia üks keskseimaid mõisteid ja teemasid läbi aastatuhenadete – on teose esimese dialoogi esimene sõna, ning „paratamatus“ (*anagkaion*) on mõiste, millega algab teise dialoogi kõnelejate vastuväide. Melose dialoog on teose keskeltjeks ja sellele järgnevad sündmused viivad Ateena impeeriumi täieliku hävinguni. Ateena ja Sparta esindavad vastandlikke, ent poliitika struktuursel tasandil üksteist täiendavaid jõude - liikumise ja paigalseisu, innovatsiooni ja konservatiivsuse, julguse ja mõõdukuse dialektikat. „Õigluse“ ja „paratamatuse“ vaheline pinge struktureerib ka tänaseid kriise – olgu selleks Ukraina rahukõnelused agressoriga, hiljuti alanud Gröönimaa kriis või Euroopa Liidu segased reaktsioonid USA rünnakutele nii Venezuelas kui Iraanis –, osutades,

et rahvusvahelisele õigusele apelleerimine ja jõupoliitiline kalkulatsioon ei asu eri tasanditel, vaid põimuvad endiselt ühes ja samas otsustussituatsioonis.

Eve Kitsik

Viini Ülikool

Mõistesüüdistamisest

Tutvustan ja kritiseerin „mõistesüüdistamist“. Mõistesüüdistamise puhul tuuakse millegi halva põhjusena sobimatult esile keeleline vahend – termini ja tähenduse paar – mitte selle kasutajad, kes tegelikult süüdistamist väärksid. Mõned võimalikud näited mõistesüüdistamisest on: (1) üleskutsed loobuda terminitest nagu „vandenõuteooria“, „võltsuudised“ ja „demokraatia“, kuna neid keelelisi vahendeid kasutatakse sageli pahatahtlikult või läbimõtle matult; (2) nõudmine, et „rassism“ peaks olema kitsama ulatusega, sest selle mõiste laia ulatusega versiooni kasutatakse tihti ebakonstruktiivselt või kuna see „lõpetab vestlusi“; ning (3) „peitesõnade jooksulint“ (*euphemism treadmill*): keskendumine võitlusele negatiivse varjundiga sõnadega (nagu „värviline“ või „kodutu“), mõtlemata piisavalt, miks need sõnad – ja nende asendused – kipuvad negatiivseid konnotatsioone omandama. Mõistesüüdistamist on vaja paremini mõista ja vältida kahel põhjusel. Esiteks, kui kriitiline tähelepanu suunatakse ekslikult keelelistele vahenditele, ei süüdistata me piisavalt neid, kes süüdistamist väärivad – keelekasutajaid, kelle esiletõstmine millegi halva põhjusena oleks kohane. Selles mõttes sarnaneb mõistesüüdistamine ohvrisüüdistamise ja (eriti) tehnoloogiasüüdistamisega. Teiseks soodustab mõistesüüdistamine ebatõhusat sekkumist. Selles mõttes on mõistesüüdistamist isegi enam alust vältida kui ohvri- ja tehnoloogiasüüdistamist. Näiteks oleme tihtipeale sunnitud (võimalikke tulevasi) ohvreid, relvi ja tehisintellekti tööriistu esile tõstma teguritena, mille kohalolu, käitumist või omadusi saab ja seetõttu tuleks muuta, et rünnakuid, relvavägivalda või akadeemilist petturlust ennetada. Tegelikest süüdlastest keelekasutajate asemel keelelistele vahenditele keskendumisel võrreldavat pragmaatilist õigustust ei ole.

Katrin Laas-Mikko

Tartu Ülikool

Tehisintellekti riskide eetiline vastuvõetavus ja eetika roll praktilistes tehisintellekti juhtimise raamistik

Käesolevas ettekandes arutlen selle üle, millistel normatiivsetel alustel saab pidada tehisintellekti süsteemide riske eetiliselt vastuvõetavaks, lähtudes Euroopa Komisjoni

usaldusväärse tehisintellekti eetika suunistest (Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI) (AI HLEG, 2019). Usaldusväärse tehisintellekti suunised on üks mõjukamaid viimase kümne aasta jooksul väljatöötatud tehisintellekti eetikasunistest. Need lähtuvad neljast eetikapõhimõttest - autonoomia austamine, mittekahjustamine, õiglus ning selgitatavus.

Kuigi usaldusväärse tehisintellekti eetikapõhimõtted ja nende alusel sõnastatud nõuded on juurdunud praktilistes rakendusstandardites või metodoloogilistes lähenemistes, näiteks standardis ISO/IEC 42005 tehisintellekti süsteemide mõjuhindamise kohta, on neid ka tugevalt kritiseeritud. Peamised kriitikakohad puudutavad normatiivse põhjendatuse ebapiisavust (Sutrop, 2019 jt) ja rakendatavuse probleeme praktikas, eelkõige liigset abstraktsust ja rakenduslike meetodite puudumist (Mittelstadt, 2019 jt).

Rekonstrueerin suuniste normatiivse loogika ning näitan, et eetikasuniste normatiivse põhjendatuse nõrkus kui ka nende kujunemise laiema tausta puudmine jätab ebaselgeks mitmed olulised küsimused, näiteks: 1) miks just eetikasunistes toodud väärtused on olulised ja kuidas arvestada rakendamise kontekstist tulenevaid muid eetilisi väärtusi; 2) millal ja mille alusel on lubatud kompromissid kui eetikapõhimõtted või nõuded on konfliktis. Neil ja mitmel muudel põhjustel kipub rakenduslikes praktikates suuniste järgimine taanduma pelgalt tehniliseks vastavuskontrolli või riskide hindamise meetodikaks, milles puudub sisuline eetiline arutelu ja kaalutlemine. Arutlen selle üle, kas ja kuidas on võimalik selliseid eetikasunistel põhinevaid lähenemisi täiendada.

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Juho Lindholm

University of Twente

The Meno Paradox and The Belief–Doubt Model of Inquiry

In the *Meno*, Plato (1952: 80c–81a) presents the famous Meno paradox. Its two horns are (1) one cannot inquire about what they know, because they know it, and in that case they are in no need of inquiry; or (2) they cannot inquire about what they do not know, since they do not know about what they are to inquire.

In this presentation, I will resolve this paradox by applying Peirce's *belief–doubt model of inquiry* and Dewey's notion of *problematic situation*. In short, meaningful inquiry about what we do not know is possible, because the criterion of the termination of inquiry is known (inquiry terminates when the problematic situation is resolved), but what exactly terminates the inquiry is unknown (a solution must be invented, constructed, and tested). We invent a solution in a cycle of abduction, deduction, and induction; if induction fails, we have to revert

to the abduction stage (Peirce CP 2.619–644, 5.161–174, 5.438–452, 5.494, 6.469–473; EP 1: 186–199; EP 2: 212–218, 287–288, 346–354, 419–420, 440–442).

Paavola and Hakkarainen (2005) have already applied Peirce's theory of inquiry to the Meno paradox. My solution is different.

Keywords: the belief–doubt model of inquiry, Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, the Meno paradox, Plato.

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Jüri Lipping

Mis on geofilosoofiline perspektiiv?

Oma ettekandes arutan Gilles Deleuze'i loomingust tõukudes geofilosoofilise perspektiivi üle. Mõtlemise ruumilise ja ruumistava iseloomu rõhutamisel käsitlen muuhlgas järgmisi aspekte: i) mõisted kui geograafilised suurused, n-õ maamärgid, millega kaardistada territooriumi; ii) ideed kui immanentsustasandid ehk probleemid, mille pingeväljas avaneb ja areneb elu enese fenomen iii) mõtlemine kui protsess, liikumine ja dünaamika, mis avaldub joonte, vektorite ja diagrammide kaudu; iv) kognitiivse kaardistamise mõiste ehk orienteerumise küsimus filosoofias; v) miks on olemisküsimus (ja selle tänased avatarid: planetaarne teadvus, võrgustunud eksistents, globaalne kapitalism ja antropotseen) samavõrd ruumilise kui ajalise kaaluga?

Kateryna Lobanova

Tallinn University of Technology

The Limits of Male Freedom in Wartime: The Ukrainian Case

Wartime changes the way freedom is discussed and understood, especially from a gender perspective. While in peacetime the state is expected to guarantee basic human rights and uphold the rule of law, wartime conditions often suspend or transform these principles. The personal freedom of male citizens may be restricted in the name of a broader national freedom: men are obliged to leave their previous activities and defend the country through military mobilization. It raises a philosophical question: can freedom still be understood as freedom when it is restricted in order to preserve itself?

This presentation examines the perspective of male experience during wartime using the Ukrainian case as an example. Drawing on modern interdisciplinary research on male rights, particularly at the intersection of masculinity and migration studies, the presentation explores how war reshapes the discussion of freedom. The paradox of restrictions on freedom and gendered expectations during wartime will be analyzed through the frameworks of masculinity and male disposability theory, highlighting their changing interpretations in contemporary philosophical discourse.

Leo Luks,

Eesti Maaülikool, Tallinna Ülikool

Euroopa pihtide vahel: Venemaa ja Ameerika Nietzsche ning Heideggeri geopoliitilistes visioonides

Ettekanne käivitub kahest väitest – kummaltki mõtlejalt üks – mis seostavad Venemaa euroopaliku nihilismi problemaatikaga. Antud mõiste pärineb teatavasti Nietzsche hilisfilosoofiast. Ühes „Puuslikehämärase“ aforismis kirub Nietzsche taas euroopalikku jõuetust ning kiidab Rooma impeeriumi vaimsust, nagu mitmel pool mujalgi. Ent seejuures seostab ta oma imperiaalse fantaasia põgusalt tulevikuga, panustades Venemaale:

„...Venemaa, ainus tänapäeva võim, millel on ihus püsivust, mis võib oodata, mis võib veel midagi töötada – Venemaa kui vastandmõiste armetule euroopalikule väikeriiklusele ja närvilisusele, mis on Saksa keisririigi rajamisega jõudnud kriisiseisundisse...“ (Nietzsche 1988: 141)

Kui antud Nietzsche tsitaat pole pälvinud kuigivõrd uurijate tähelepanu, siis sedavõrd kuulsam on Heideggeri provokatiivne määrang 1935. a:

„See Euroopa, uskumatus pimestuses üha valmis ennast ise surnuks pistma, lebab täna suurte pihtide vahel, üheltpoolt Venemaa ja teiselt poolt Ameerika vahel. Venemaa ja

Ameerika on mõlemad, metafüüsiliselt nähtuna, seesama; seesama ahelaist vabanenud tehnika ja normaalinimse pinnatu organiseerimise troostitu märatsemine“ (Heidegger 1996: 57)

Viimase ajani võis pidada mõlemat määrangut liialdatuks, isegi ekslikuks. Nagu teada, suubus Nietzsche poolt kiidetud Venemaa imperiaalne potentsiaal 20. sajandil raamistatud sotsialistlikusse ideoloogiasse, mis oli Nietzsche jaoks üks vihatuim dekadentsi avaldus. Samavõrd põlgas Nietzsche ka natsionalismi. Kahtlane tundus ka Heideggeri samastustees kontekstis, kus maailmapoliitikas edendas Venemaa (NSVL) orjastavat totalitarismi ja USA vaatamata mõningatele imperiaalsetele tunnusoontele demokraatiat ja inimõigusi jõustavat maailmapolitseid.

Viimase aja sündmuste valguses peaks mõlemad kõnealused väited taaskord üle tõlgendama ning tundub, et need muutuvad pelutavalt paikapidavaks. Kas pole Venemaa oma brutaalses sõjategevuses asunud teostama imperiaalset poliitikat, mis tugineb puhtale jõule ja domineerimisele, ilmutades selles visadust ja kannatlikkust, millega hedonistlikul Euroopal on üha raskem sammu pidada? Ning kas ei paista Trumpi administratsiooni juhitud USA samasus säärase Venemaaga päev-päevalt üha kehtivam, mitte üksnes abstraktsel metafüüsilisel, vaid ka reaalspoliitilisel tasandil?

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Marius Markuckas

Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania

Can AI Create? A Disability Art Perspective

This paper reflects on the problem of AI creativity, identifying the following question as its main focus: can AI create? It aims to demonstrate that an idealized approach to the phenomenon of creativity—one that has developed over millennia in Western cultural and intellectual thought and emphasizes human power and perfection as its central features—not only inadequately represents the process of creativity but also gives rise to biased criteria for evaluating the creative potential of AI. By employing an analysis of disability art, the paper proposes an alternative account of the creative process to the traditionally dominant idealized approach and demonstrates that a more comprehensive reflection on AI is required—not only from the standpoint of human ability, but also from that of human disability. Accordingly, it is argued that, in seeking to understand the status of AI with regard to creative processes, it is more productive to consider what AI cannot do rather than what it can do and to ask what its relation is to the phenomenon of inability in general.

Keywords: human; AI; creativity; disability; disability art

Alessio Martino

University of Trieste and Udine, Italy

Technological Intentionality and the Concept of Flesh: A Merleau-Pontian Perspective on Technological Mediation

This contribution aims to explore how technological activity can be meaningfully described within contemporary models of image generation, focusing specifically on Stable Diffusion 3. The research question is: in what sense can technology itself be said to possess intentionality and activity, rather than merely mediating human intention? To answer this question, we first focus on the postphenomenological interpretation of technological intentionality, arguing that this theoretical framework remains insufficient to capture the distinctive form of activity exhibited by generative models. Adopting a phenomenological perspective, we argue that technological intentionality possesses a relative autonomy, an autonomous structuring of meaning independent of human control. The central thesis is that Merleau-Ponty's late concept of flesh provides the conceptual resources to understand this autonomy without abandoning the relational field between humans and technology. Furthermore, conceived as a dynamic and relational system, flesh allows us to grasp the interaction between subjectivity and artificial systems, while also offering a careful examination of technological individualities and their varying degrees of activity. From this perspective, technological activity, clearly expressed by generative models, consists in the autonomous structuring of meaning within a shared relational space.

Anu Masso

Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance

Tallinn University of Technology

Do Machines Have Rhythm? AI and the Reorganisation of Urban Life

Technologies have the power to restructure everyday lives, environments, and the world itself. Yet we still lack a clear understanding of the mechanisms through which artificial intelligence is reshaping social and urban realities. One key barrier has been the dominance of two competing discourses: AI as progress and innovation, or AI as a critical force producing inequality and exclusion. This keynote proposes a shift beyond this dichotomy by introducing a neutral analytical framework grounded in Henri Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis. It asks how data-rich and AI-driven systems restructure urban rhythms across time and space. As each

city constitutes a distinct rhythmic configuration, AI systems – including autonomous vehicles – are understood as interventions into everyday temporal structures that may either synchronise with or disrupt existing urban rhythms. Empirically, the talk draws on a comparative study across 26 cities, combining cognitive eye-tracking with crowdsourced survey data. Focusing on everyday events in urban mobility, it examines how AI-mediated rhythms are perceived, how experience is articulated, and how disruptions and adaptations emerge in practice. It also addresses a core design challenge: how to build AI systems that can operate across highly heterogeneous rhythmic environments. The keynote ultimately reframes AI not only as a technological system, but as a force that reorganises the social and ethical configuration of urban life, with implications for inclusion, inequality, and urban knowledge production.

Bio: Anu Masso is an Associate Professor of Big Data in Social Sciences at the Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology. Her research focuses on the social dimensions of data technologies, with particular attention to data movements, spatial mobilities, and social transformations. She is also known for her work on social science methods and methodologies, including data and AI ethics. Her publications include articles in leading journals such as *Population, Space and Place*; *Information Systems Frontiers*; *Social Networks*; *New Media & Society*; and *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. She is currently the principal investigator of the Estonian Research Council-funded project *Data Migration: A Social Transformation Framework* and held a Global Digital Governance Fellowship at Stanford University (2022). She has published the award-winning book *How to Understand a Datafied World? A Methodological Guide* (2020, in Estonian) and *The Data Welfare State* (2025) with Anne Kaun.

Bogdan Mićić

University of Vienna

Re-reading Aristotle's Kat. 5, 3 b10–23: Essential Properties in between Quality and Essence

Throughout history, most (Western) philosophers have shared the (presumably sensible) *intuition* that among an individual's qualitative properties, some are more closely tied to what it is—its essence—than others, which are merely accidental¹. A prevalent modern view reduces this distinction to modal status: properties an individual has necessarily are essential; those held contingently are accidental, or more generally: non-essential². Yet recent work

¹ Cf. e. g. Gorman 2005, 276, my emph.: “The distinction between the essential and the accidental [...] [grows] out of the intuitive idea that some of a thing's features are *more central* or *more important* to it than others are.”

² Cf. e. g. Gorman 2005, 276; or just as well Robertson Ishii and Atkins 2023, 1, original emph. “The distinction between *essential versus accidental properties* [...] is often understood in modal terms: an *essential property of an object* is a property that it must have, while an *accidental property of an object* is one that it happens to have but that it could lack.”

challenges this reduction and some authors even question whether accidental properties exist at all³.

Remarkably, even Aristotle—often credited with introducing the distinction—seems to reject a purely modal reduction⁴. In a neglected passage of the *Categories*, he notes that essential properties behave much like other qualitative properties, making their identification non-trivial⁵. In this context, Aristotle offers an interesting criterion: losing a non-essential property deprives the subject of little, whereas losing an essential property results in the loss of all other properties—suggesting that essential properties delineate the (metaphorical) ‘space’ of what a thing can or must exhibit⁶. In my opinion, this brings Aristotle’s view close to contemporary accounts that explain essentiality in terms of “explanation”⁷, or *grounding*⁸. Taking into consideration the Ancient method of *anaíresis*⁹, I argue Aristotle’s position is best understood along these lines.

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³ One of the better known objections has been raised by Kit Fine. Cf. Fine 1994, 3: “the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equivalent to a modal notion.” For an overview of various alternatives and revisions that have been proposed in recent decades cf. Robertson Ishii and Atkins 2023, esp. 8–15.

⁴ Cf. Fine 1994, 2: “He [sc. Aristotle] does not, as far as I know, give a modal account of essence”.

⁵ *Kat.* 5, 3 b13–18: ἐ πὶ δὲ τῶ ν δευτέ ρων οὐ σιῶ ν φαίνεται με ν ὁ μοίως τῶ σχή ματι τῆ ς προσηγορίας τό δε τι σημαίνειν, ὅ ταν εἶπη ἄ νθρωπον ἢ ζῷ ον· οὐ μὴ ν ἄ ληθέ ς γε, ἄ λλά μᾶλλον ποιό ν τι σημαί νει, – οὐ γὰ ρ ἔ ν ἐ στι τὸ ὑ ποκείμενον ὅ σπερ ἢ πρῶ τη οὐ σία, ἄ λλά κατὰ πολλῶ ν ὁ ἄ νθρωπος λέ γεται καὶ τὸ ζῷ ον· [...].

⁶ *Kat.* 5, 3 b18–21: οὐ χ ἄ πλῶ ς δὲ ποιό ν τι σημαίνει, ὅ σπερ τὸ λευκό ν. οὐ δὲ ν γὰ ρ ἄ λλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκό ν ἄ λλ’ ἢ ποιό ν. τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γέ νος περὶ οὐ σίαν τὸ ποιό ν ἄ φορίζει· ποιά ν γὰ ρ τινα οὐ σίαν σημαίνει.

⁷ Cf. Gorman 2005, 282–289, esp. 284: “*F* is essential to *x* just in case *F* is (i) a characteristic of *x* and (ii) not explained by any other characteristic of *x*. By contrast, *F* is accidental to *x* just in case *F* is (i) a characteristic of *x* and (ii) explained by some other characteristic of *x*.”

⁸ Cf. on the notion of *grounding* in contemporary ‘analytic’ philosophy e. g. Krä mer and Schnieder 2017, 278; or just as well Brotero de Rizzo and Schnieder 2020, 409.

⁹ Cf. e. g. *Eis.* [chap. 14] 20, 18–20; esp. [chap. 9] 16, 16–18: τὰ με ν ἴδια ἄ ναιρού μενα οὐ συναναιρεῖ τὰ γέ νη, τὰ δὲ γέ νη ἄ ναιρού μενα συναναιρεῖ τὰ εἶδη, ὡς ν ἐ στιν ἴδια, ὅ στε καὶ ὡς ν ἐ στιν ἴδια ἄ ναιρουμέ νων καὶ αὐ τὰ συναναιρεῖται.

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Meha Mishra

University of Petroleum and Energy Studies (UPES), India

From Catuskoti to Saptabhangi: Enhancing AI Ethics through Indian Schools of Philosophy

The paper explores how concepts from Indian philosophy can open new directions in AI ethics by providing alternative approaches to reasoning about uncertainty, complexity, and cultural variation. Drawing on the Buddhist framework of Catuskoti which expands logic beyond binary categories and the Jain model of Saptabhangi which articulates multiple conditional standpoints, the research seeks to design ethical tools that reflect the nuanced and plural character of human judgment. Unlike dominant Western traditions in AI ethics, which often emphasize universal principles of duty, utility, or virtue, these systems of thought embed truth and morality within contextual relations and conditional perspectives. By transforming these logics into computationally usable frameworks, the project aims to develop hybrid models for ethical AI that can operate in situations of contradiction or ambiguity without collapsing into inaction. The outcome will be theoretical and applied contributions: philosophical reinterpretations of non-Western logics, novel methods for embedding pluralism into machine reasoning, and case studies demonstrating how such models could enhance fairness, transparency, and human trust in AI.

Keywords: Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Logic, Jaina Logic, Multi-valued Logic, Decision-making, Artificial Intelligence, AI Ethics.

Bruno Mölder

Tartu Ülikool

Vaba tahe kui omistus

Raamatus „Mind Ascribed“ (2010) esitasin vaimse põhjuslikkuse käsituse, mis lähtus Jacksoni ja Pettit'i eristusest põhjusliku *tegususe* ja põhjusliku *olulisuse* vahel. Kombineerisin selle vaheteo eristusega kahe viisi vahel, kuidas saab mõista entiteete. Entiteetidest saab

rääkida *inflatsioonilises* mõttes (tabades seda, kuidas entiteet päriselt on) ja *deflatsioonilises* mõttes (sedastades lihtsalt, et entiteet on teataval moel kirjeldatav). Näiteks arusaam, mille kohaselt iga tõene predikaadi rakendus objektile tähistab mõnda selle omadust, on deflatsiooniline. Nõnda saame hulgaliselt pleonastilisi omadusi. Väitsin, et vaimsed omadused, ja entiteedid üldisemalt, on pleonastilised entiteedid.

Kombineeritud arusaama järgi saavad põhjuslikult tegusad olla vaid inflatsioonilised entiteedid. Üksnes deflatsioonilised, ehk nn pleonastilised entiteedid ei saa olla põhjuslikult tegusad, küll aga saavad nad olla põhjuslikult olulised, figureerides põhjuslikus *seletuses*. Tõene, põhjuslikult oluline seletus annab märku, et hõlmatud on ka põhjuslikult tegusad inflatsioonilised entiteedid. Vaimuseisundite tõesed omistused, mille eesmärgiks on seletada toimunud tegusid, annavad niisiis märku, et ajus leidsid aset mingisugused tegusad seisundid, mis põhjustasid antud teoga seotud füüsilisi liigutusi. Sedalaadi lõtv seos pleonastiliste ja inflatsiooniliste entiteetide vahel ei ole interpretivismiga vastuolus.

Ettekandes esitan käsituse vabast tahtest, mis moodustab loomuliku paari sellise arusaamaga vaimsest põhjuslikkusest. Selle järgi kuulub vaba tahe toimija kirjeldustasandile, mitte põhjuslikult tegusate ajuprotsesside tasandile. Vaba tahet omistatakse toimijale tõlgenduses, mis väljendab toimija käitumise suhtes põhjuslikult olulisi aspekte, muutes tema teod mõistetavaks talle omistatud kaalutluste, otsuste ja enesekontrolli valgusel. Siin pole vastuolu väitega, et aju on deterministlik süsteem selles mõttes, et igal ajuprotsessil on tegus põhjus, ega väitega, et igal füüsilisel liigutusel on tegus põhjus aju.

Sunjida Mukta

School of Humanities, Eötvös Loránd University

Artificial Intelligence and the Normative Foundations of Moral Responsibility

Artificial intelligence systems are currently employed in healthcare, transportation, governance, and decision-support scenarios, where their outputs significantly impact human actions and ethically pertinent results. AI systems do not possess unique characteristics that are usually linked with moral responsibility, such as rational deliberation, moral cognition, and the sense of morality (Floridi et al., 2018). This paper examines the normative grounds of moral responsibility in situations when AI systems are introduced to interfere in morally relevant human behavior but cannot be moral agents. The notion of voluntary action, practical wisdom (phronesis) and human flourishing (eudaimonia) as developed in the Nicomachean Ethics, the paper investigates the idea of moral responsibility with human-AI relations (Aristotle, 2009). The argumentative approach of the paper is based on the conceptual and normative philosophical analysis that responsibility in AI-mediated environments is human but is distributed throughout complex socio-technical systems (Coeckelbergh, 2020). The application of the classical virtue ethics to the modern technological dilemma makes this research significant to the discussions in the moral philosophy and the philosophy of technology. It also provides a normative paradigm of how AI changes human moral agency and ethical life in technologically mediated societies.

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Hamza Naseer

University of Tartu

A defense of the belief view of amodal completion.

Amodal completion is defined, depending on one’s philosophical worldview, as the perception/representation of parts of objects that we receive no sensory stimulation from.

I defend these two claims: (i) that our amodal completion is informed by the visible portions of the target object, and (ii) that our amodal completion is informed by the overall background knowledge we have of the target object. This view is referred to in the literature as the “belief account” (Nanay 2007, 2010). Nanay argues that the belief account is wrong by appealing to a host of empirical data coupled with some philosophical reasoning (Nanay 2018, Nanay 2022).

I challenge Nanay’s claim by pointing out that the empirical data he relies on and more recent work on amodal completion, does not endorse his claim. I also challenge his philosophical reasoning against the belief account. Those are the negative parts of my paper. The positive parts go to show how memory, both in the form of stored beliefs (long term memory) as well as short term beliefs (working memory), are involved in amodal completion - so much so that the act of amodal completion could not occur without the use of memory.

Rita Niineste

Tallinn University

Põhjuslikkus ja motivatsioon seksuaalsuse analüüsikategooriatena

Seksuaalsust on filosoofias ja teaduses sageli mõtestatud kahe domineeriva raamistiku kaudu. Ühelt poolt käsitlevad bioloogilised ja evolutsioonilised lähenemised seksuaalset iha mehhanismina, mille esmane funktsioon on liigi taastootmine. Teiselt poolt nähakse paljudes eetilistes ja kultuurilistes traditsioonides seksuaalsuse tähendust eelkõige armastuse ja paarisuhte kontekstis. Kuigi mõlemad lähenemised toovad esile seksuaalsuse olulisi aspekte, jääb neis suurel määral analüüsimate seksuaalse kogemuse afektiivne struktuur.

Ettekandes arendan fenomenoloogilist käsitlust, mis lähtub seksuaalsest ihast kui afektiivse intentsionaalsuse vormist. Tuginedes fenomenoloogilisele eristusele põhjuslikkuse ja motivatsiooni vahel, käsitlen seksuaalsust mitte instinktiivse mehhanismi, vaid motiveeritud hoiakuna. Selle struktuuri täpsustamiseks kasutan eristust vajaduse ja iha vahel. Kui vajadus on määratletud konkreetse puuduva objekti kaudu, siis iha ületab alati oma objekte ega saa kunagi lõplikult rahuldatud.

Seksuaalne iha väljendab seda struktuuri eriti selgelt. Selle täitumine ei seisne vajaduse rahuldamises, vaid naudingus, mis iha ühtaegu esile toob ja seda taaselustab. Iha ja naudingu vastastiksuhte analüüs näitab, et seksuaalsust ei saa mõista pelgalt bioloogilise funktsioonina, vaid seda tuleb käsitleda tähendusliku motivatsioonistruktuurina, mille kaudu kujuneb ka seksuaalne subjektsus ja enesemõistmine.

Mehmet Orpak

Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology

On Disasters, the Cosmic Pessimism, and Futilitarian Possibilities

When society goes through several calamities at once, the rational individual ceases to exist, calculations for *utility* maximization break down, and these personal anomies eventually culminate in a public feeling of world-weariness. Yet, “life must go on”, and people find ways to cope with that feeling. Ancient Greek tragedies during the Greco-Persian and Peloponnesian wars (5th century BC), Late Roman confessions during the Roman decadence (5th century AD), and Medieval Islamic esoteric poems during the Mongol Invasions (13th and 14th centuries) can be read as different faces of the same phenomenon—the celebration of *futility*. Shortly after, scapegoats given to the gods mark the beginnings of new eras: Socrates (d. 399 BC) in Greece, Boethius (d. 524) in Rome, and many executed mystics in Islamic lands. But only then did the Greeks have the Academia (387 BC), the Romans get their *Corpus Juris Civilis* (529), and the Muslims have their *waqfs*, or *zawaya*. Apparently, a society collapses, catharsis is experienced with a climax of sacrifice, and institutions are born and rise around the altar. Finally, these institutions constitute the *futurity* of the given society. Based on this pattern, I want to present a cyclical framework for the philosophy of history.

Margus Ott

Eesti Maaülikool, Tartu Ülikool, Tallinna Ülikool

Teadus kui kompleksne adaptiivne süsteem

Süsteemid on üldiselt kompleksed; lihtsad süsteemid on piirjuhtumid. Teadus, mis neid süsteeme uurib, on ka ise kompleksne süsteem. Ettekandes esitatakse kõigepealt komplekssete adaptiivsete süsteemide kolmetasandiline ontoloogia: läbistuvus, individuatsioon, kõrvutuvus. Seejärel näidatakse, kuidas sama kirjeldust saab rakendada teadussüsteemile. Lisaks pakutakse selle kirjeldamiseks välja ökosüsteemi metafoor ning väidetakse see paremaks ehitamise või pusle kokkupanemise metafoorist. Viimaks tehakse sellisest teaduse kirjeldusest mõningad järeldused heuristikale ja eetikale.

Aive Pevkur

Tallinn University of Technology

Tehisteine isik ehk tehisik, kas kolleeg või kratt? Arutlus akadeemilise eetika radadelt.

Akadeemiline autorlus on traditsiooniliselt seotud individuaalse moraalse agendiga, kes vastutab nii teaduslike ideede kui ka nende esituse eest. Tehisintellekti laialdane kasutamine akadeemilises kirjutamises muudab aga teadmise loomise protsessi. AI-süsteemid osalevad üha sagedamini ideede genereerimises, argumentide struktureerimises ning tekstiloomes, mistõttu teaduslik kirjutamine toimub sageli inimese ja algoritmilise assistendi interaktsioonis. Seejuures on algoritmiline assistent kujunenud/ kujundatud inimese meele järgi, kus küsimused, üleslaetud materjalid, ümbertöötatud tekstid annavad tehismeelele sisu. Sellest hoolimata käsitlevad kehtivad akadeemilise eetika juhised AI-d peamiselt tööriistana, mille kasutamist tuleb küll deklareerida, kuid mida ei peeta või mida ei taluta teadmise loomise protsessi osalisena.

Ettekandes esitan idee hübriidautorlusest, mille kohaselt võiks akadeemilises tekstis identifitseerida lisaks inimautorile ka kasutatud AI-assistendi, kirjeldades ära mudeli ja miks mitte, andes talle nime (teisikmina ehk tehisik). Selline lähenemine ei tähenda moraalse vastutuse ülekandmist AI-le. Vastutus jääb jätkuvalt inimese kanda. Pigem toimiks AI identifitseerimine episteemilise teisiku nähtavastegemisena, suurendades sel viisil protsessi läbipaistvust ja usaldusväarsust.

Hübriidautorluse kontseptsioon võimaldaks filosoofiliselt ümber mõtestada akadeemilise autorluse normatiivsed eeldused olukorras, kus teaduslik loomeprotsess toimub üha enam inimese ja tehnoloogilise süsteemi koostöös.

Vivian Puusepp

Tartu Ülikool

Filosoofilise kirjutamise kriis tehisaru ajastul

Suurtel keelemudelitel põhinevate tekstirobotite kasutamine on üliõpilaste seas kiiresti levinud ning nende kasutamist on keeruline tuvastada. See seab küsimärgi alla paljud senised akadeemilised õpetamis- ja hindamismeetodid. Ettekandes käsitlen filosoofilise kirjutamise kriisi tehisaru ajastul ehk küsin, kas tudengiessee on surnud. Kas ja miks peaks filosoofiaüliõpilastelt jätkuvalt nõudma iseseisvaid kirjalikke töid? Lähtun arusaamast, et filosoofiline kirjutamine ei ole pelgalt olemasolevate mõtete teksti kujule vormistamine, vaid filosoofilise mõtlemise keskne mehhanism, mille kaudu arenevad analüüsi-, argumenteerimis- ja metakognitiivsed oskused. Haridusteaduslikud- ja kognitiivteaduslikud uuringud näitavad, et aktiivset vaimset pingutust nõudvad õpiülesanded toetavad õppimist paremini kui passiivsed ülesanded. Kuna tehisaru kasutamine kirjutamise abivahendina võib muuta õppija passiivsemaks, võivad sellel olla õppimisele ebasoovitavad tagajärjed. Seetõttu väidan, et tehisaru kiire ja kriitikavaba lõimimine õppeprotsessi võib ohustada ülikooli rolli iseseisvalt mõtlemaid indiviide kujundava institutsioonina. Lahendus ei seisne ei kirjalikest ülesannetest loobumises ega tehisaru keelustamises, vaid iseseisva mõtlemise väärtustamises ning sellise akadeemilise kultuuri loomises ja hoidmises, mis põhineb õppejõu ja üliõpilase vahelisel usaldusel, aususel ja vastastikusel austusel.

Kevin Rändi

Tallinna Ülikool / Tallinna Tehnikakõrgkool

Tootvale tehisintellektile delegeerimine postfenomenoloogilisest vaatest

Arvatavasti on paljude jaoks tuttavaks saanud olukord, kus kellelegi usaldatud tunnetustegevus delegeeritakse tootvale tehisintellektile (TI). Inimeste vahel jagatakse sisu ning sõltutakse TI toodetud sisust ja hinnangutest. Ettekanne analüüsib tootvale TI-le delegeerimise praktikaid postfenomenoloogia ja sotsiaalepistemoloogia perspektiivist. Postfenomenoloogia võtab uurimuse aluseks tehnika ja inimese suhted ning uurib, kuidas tehnika kasutusviisid kujunevad ja kuidas tehnikaga koos ja selle vahendusel tajud ja moraal moodustuvad (Ihde, 1990; Verbeek, 2011). Bruno Latouri (1992) kohaselt on tehnoloogiline vahendus ja artefaktidele delegeerimine sotsiaalses konfiguratsioonis iseloomulik kõigile artefaktidele.

Postfenomenoloogilisest vaatest tuleks inimese ja tootva TI suhtes toimuvat delegeerimist vaadata läbi teisesuse, milles TI kasutajaliideses on justkui assistent, kellest episteemiliselt ja praktiliselt oleme hakanud sõltuma. Kuid väidan, et delegeerimise praktikad tootva TI puhul ei piirdu sedaviisi teisesusega, vaid kätkevad ka inimestevahelist suhet ja selle muutusi (vt ka Rändi & Laas, 2024). Sellest lähtuvalt, kuigi TI-le delegeerimise puhul on arutatud selle negatiivset mõju näiteks episteemilise agentsuse ja sõltuvuse osas (Coeckelbergh, 2026; Koskinen, 2024), on oluline ka see, kuidas tootva TI kasutuspraktikad delegeerimise kontekstis võivad muuta inimestevahelisi suhteid olenevalt sellest, kuidas TI-d kasutatakse.

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Indrek Reiland

Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies

Does Language Use Require Intentions?

Is language use essentially intentional or at least intention-entailing so that you can't engage in it unintentionally? Many philosophers have thought that it is. But this view faces several counterexamples ranging from slips of the tongue, phonic tics, and talk while asleep. In this talk I will consider this question across three levels of language use: word use, meaningful use, and social-communicative or illocutionary acts and argue for a mixed verdict. While it is possible to unintentionally use words and perhaps use them meaningfully, it's more problematic to think that one can unintentionally perform genuine social-communicative acts.

Andres Reimann

Kaitseväe Akadeemia

Hirmust ebaõigluseni: Judith Shklar külma sõja liberalismi kriitikuna

Vaidlused liberalismis mõtteajaloo üle moodustavad poliitikafilosoofia uurimise olulise osa, kus viimastel aastatel on jõuliselt esile kerkinud külma sõja liberalismi (KSL) kriitika. Näiteks väidab Samuel Moyn (*“Liberalism against Itself”*, 2023), et KSL “rikkus” liberalismi, hüljates selle 19. sajandi lõpu emantsipatoorse pärandi. Selles narratiivis omistatakse Judith Shklarile

traagiline roll: ta olevat taandunud varasest KSL-i kriitikust passiivsesse „Hirmuliberalismi“ (1989), millest on Jan-Werner Mülleri tõlgenduses saanud mõttevoolu tüvitekst.

Minu ettekanne vaidlustab selle tõlgenduse. Esiteks näitan, et lugedes „Hirmuliberalismi“ kontekstuaalselt – sekkumisena 1980. aastate lõpu USA poliitilistesse vaidlustesse –, osutub see hoopis KSL-i kriitikaks. Arvestades USA presidendivalimiste kampaaniat, mille liberalismivastaste rünnakute taustal Shklar 1988 oma kontseptsiooni esitles, ning avalikkust raputanud Iraani-Contra skandaali, kerkib essee esile KSL-ile omase Ameerika interventsionismi kriitikana.

Teiseks väidan, et KSL-i raamistik hägustab Shklari hilisloomingut, ületähtsustades hirmuliberalismi. Tema hilisemast tekstikorpusest (*“Faces of Injustice”*, *“American Citizenship”*, *“On Political Obligation”*) koorub välja koherentne ebaõigluse teooria, mis reageerib kriitiliselt Isaiah Berlinile, John Rawlsile ja Michael Walzerile. Shklar asetab esiplaanile demokraatliku agentse kodaniku, kodanikuallumatuse, ebaõigluse taju ning individuaalse südametunnistuse. Sellisel emantsipatoorsel teorial on mitmeid ühisjooni just hilise 19. sajandi liberalismiga, mille KSL olevat Moyni hinnangul kõrvale heitnud. Laiemalt illustreerib ettekanne, kuidas KSL töötab poliitikafilosoofias sageli reduktsionistliku historiograafilise sildina.

Mario Rosentau

Tartu Ülikool

AI tempora ... – Quo vaditis, homo et machina loquentes?

- Kui suuline kõne on mõtlemise viis ja kiri keele tehnoloogia¹⁰, siis mida kujutab kirjakeelest „pöörd-projekteeritud“ vestlus?
- Kui hõlmav ja koherentne on keelemudelid sisalduv maailmamudel?
- Kas keelemudelid käsitavad mõisteid? Juhtumianalüüs 1: mida mudelid „ise arvavad“ enda mõistevõimekusest?
- Kas keelemudelid mõtleavad loogiliselt?¹¹ Juhtumianalüüs 2: Loomulikus keeles programmeerimine.
- Fakt: inimesed on keelemudelitega dialoogis. Sestap vaadake dialoogi tüüpe.¹²
- Kui dialoogis üks mõtleb, kas teine „mõtleb kaasa“? Kas „kaasamõtleva“ on esimese kaas-subjekt?

¹⁰ Gleick, J. (2011). *The Information: A History, a Theory, a Flood*. New York: Pantheon Books.

¹¹ Pan, L. et al (2023). Logic-LM: Empowering large language models with symbolic solvers for faithful logical reasoning (arXiv:2305.12295).

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¹² Walton, D. (2007). *Dialog theory for critical argumentation*. John Benjamins.

- Keelearu jagatud subjektsus nüüd: (keeletöö) assistent; teadaandja – Tark; planeerija – Oraakel...
- Kui keelearu on kaasamõtteleja, on inimese mõtlemine sellevõrra laiendatud (*extended thinking*).
- Kas hüperinteraktiivne keelekeskkond tähendab supraindividuaalse teadvuse (uut) taset?

Rait Rosin

Vaikse teadmise lisandist elava kultuuri refleksioonidesse

Richard Shustermani kehalise kogemuse fenomenoloogia liigitub teistegi vaikivat teadmist (tacit knowledge) esiletõstivate teooriate hulka. Need kunstikogemust õilistavad teooriad kipuvad kunstikogemust ja kunstitegevust selgitama läbi reflekteeritud, teadvustatud meetodite, millel on omadus olla eelkõige mõistetav vaid üksiti praktikas endas väljenduva järgi käies. Üheks oluliseks mõtteliseks lisandiks, mis sellistes arutlustes esile kerkib, on kultuurimälu ja -tõlgenduse mitmekihilisus. Otsesõnu väljenduvale arutlusele sekundeerib siin elava käsitöölise või kätega, vahetul kokkupuutel loodava kultuuri kui elava traditsiooni panustamine.

Enda ettekandes küsin ja püüan, analüüsides maalikunsti kunstitraditsiooni, leida vastust küsimusele, kuidas kandev osa antud vaikselt teadmisele rajanevast kunstitegemisest võiks jõuda kultuuriajaloo käsitlustesse? Mis põhjustel jääb eeldusena elav, praktilisest kogemusest võrsuv teadmine kõrvale eelkõige kirjutamise kaudu kultuuriajaloo konstrueerimise püüetest? Elava traditsiooni elujõulisus näib olevat ainult hetkeline füüsilise vahetu kokkupuute jõulisus, kui artefaktiks on mingi füüsilises dimensioonis kogetav produkt/saadus/tulem. Millistel omadustel on eelis mõjuda läbi elava esituse ja kogeja vahetu kokkupuute ning praktilise meetodi järgimise pinnal? Kuidas ära tunda kultuuriloo tõlgendust, mis tõstab kilbile elava traditsiooni elushoidmise, enda praktikast esilekerkiva vaikselt teadmise lisandusi?

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Tuğba Sevinç

Kadir Has University, İstanbul

Digital Vigilance: A Civic Virtue Perspective

Recent literature on digital technologies—including social networks, algorithms, and AI—highlights how these tools facilitate both new and expanded forms of arbitrary power creating novel venues for domination. In this article, I will argue that in addition to legal, political and structural measures against digital domination, we should be seeking ways and policies to cultivate in citizens the required civic virtues, broadly understood as desired character traits and dispositions— that are crucial for living in the age of digital societies like ours. Digital societies require *vigilant* citizens who are aware of the risks of digital forms of domination (in addition to traditional forms) and have acquired/developed the necessary character traits and dispositions (and not only the formal skills e.g., AI and social media literacy) to respond accordingly. Philip Pettit’s neo-republicanism is mainly institutional and state-centric; hence the role of active citizenry is limited, yet republican theory is distinguished by and significantly relied on the role of virtuous citizens; hence civic education has a central importance. Developing a republican civic virtue ethics and a corresponding civic virtue education suitable to digital societies is indispensable for our societies, especially given the limits of legal measures.

Kadri Simm

Tartu Ülikool

Autonoomia – tehisaru on abiks?

Autonoomia on kaasaegses moraalifilosoofias ja ka bioetikas üks kesksemaid mõisteid. Nagu ikka filosoofias, on ka seda mõistet sisustatud erinevalt – alates üsna õhukestest arusaamadest kuni nõudlikumate mudeliteni, mis seavad autonoomiale ranged normatiivsed kriteeriumid. Dworkin on öelnud, et tegemist on pigem „kunstilise terminiga“ ja konsensus valitseb ainult selles osas, mis puudutab selle üldist positiivset kaastähendust („it is a desirable quality to have“). Erinevused lähenemistes muutuvad aga oluliseks olukordades, kus inimene ei saa oma tahet ise väljendada. Tahangi analüüsida autonoomia mõistet ühes uues kontekstis, mida tehisaru tulek on loonud – nimelt oma tahet mitte väljendada suutva patsiendi autonoomsuse rekonstrueerimist indiviidi digitaalsest jäljest (nn Personal Patient Preference Predictor). See sunnib küsima, kas autonoomiat saab mõista kui üksikuid ajaliselt piiritletud otsuseid või pigem kui inimese elu jooksul kujunevat väärtuselist profiili? Samuti kerkib küsimus, millist tüüpi mõjutused –suhetest või keskkonnast tulenevad, juhuslikud jne – tuleks lugeda autonoomia osaks ning miks.

Miguel Simões

Ifilnova (Nova University of Lisbon)

The Problem of Induction in David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

I treat Hume's problem of induction as a privileged *locus* to determine his conception of (philosophical) rationality. Specifically, I defend that his overall position concerning induction intends to articulate conceptual (philosophical) empiricism with (causal-inferential) naturalism, rather than affirming scepticism.

I begin with his conceptual empiricism, trying both to understand and to appreciate its philosophical import. Then I address the problem of induction as resulting from the application of such empiricism to the case of causality (inference for the future). I proceed with examining the sceptical side of Hume's position about induction, namely its theoretical character (absence of *argumentative* justification for the causal inference, be it logical (a priori) or based on experience (a posteriori)). Subsequently, I consider his philosophical acceptance of the reasonings of common life (his rejection of radical or Pyrrhonian scepticism), as well as his thesis of a pre-established harmony between the causal relations in nature and the human instinctual inference (causal inferential *naturalism*). Finally, I characterize Hume's overall position as described above, as well as attempt to draw some further philosophical consequences from it.

Margit Sutrop

Tartu Ülikool

Kas tehisintellekt muudab õpetaja ülearuseks? Hariduse eesmärk ja õpetaja asendamatus

Ettekande põhitees on, et tehisintellekti (TI) tulek haridusse ei muuda õpetajat vähem oluliseks, vaid toob selgemalt esile vajaduse lähtuda hariduse sügavalt eetilisest olemusest. Praegused arutelud TI kasutuse eeliste ja riskide üle hariduses lähtuvad sageli instrumentaalsest hariduskäsitusest, mille järgi hariduse ülesanne on teadmiste edastamine või individuaalse soorituse parandamine. Hiljutine kirjanduse ülevaade näitab, et TI-haridusuuringud keskenduvad peamiselt rakendustele, süsteemide disainile, kasutuselevõtule ja mõjudele hariduskeskkonnas (Wang et al., 2024). Kuigi on uuritud, kuidas õpetajad tajuvad oma rolli muutumist (Piazza jt, 2025), küsitakse harvem normatiivselt, milline peaks olema õpetaja roll TI ajastul (Felix, 2020) ning mis on õpetamise mõte TI-õpetamismasinatate tingimustes (Lee, 2023; Jin ja Wang, 2025). Seda küsimust ei küsi ka Eesti TI-Hüppe projekt, mida ka põgusalt käsitletakse.

Haridusfilosoofiline tees, mida kaitstakse, on, et hariduse eesmärk on aidata inimesel kujundada tähenduslik suhe maailmaga (Sutrop, 2014). See eeldab maailma tundmaõppimise kõrval ka iseenda mõistmist inimese, kultuuri kandja ja sotsiaalse olendina. Kui hariduse eesmärk on aidata inimesel luua ühendus maailmaga, siis TI on selles piiratud: tema suhe tegelikkusega on kaudne, ta võib hallutsineerida, tal on piiratud aja- ja ruumitaju, tal ei ole juuri ega kuuluvustunnet nagu inimestel. TI ei saa juhatada inimest maailmas olemisse, sest tal endal puudub kohalolu.

TI võib olla tõhus selgitamises, harjutamises ja tagasisides, kuid tal puudub tõeline ligipääs inimese kujunemisele tervikuna. Tal ei ole subjektsust, biograafiat, haavatavust, emotsioone, päris vastutust ega iseloomu. Seetõttu ei saa ta mõjutada õppurit oma eeskujuga, mis on kasvatuses tuum.

Mida enam TI võtab üle hariduse instrumentaalse mõõtme, seda nähtavamaks saab hariduse mitteinstrumentaalne tuum. TI ei saa toetada õppiija kujunemist terviklikuks isiksuseks. Inimeseks olemist saab õpetada vaid teine inimene, mitte masin.

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Elle-Mari Talivee

Under and Tuglas Literary Institute of the Estonian Academy of Sciences

& Amirouche Moktefi

Ragnar Nurkse department of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology

Kratt: From Estonian folklore to artificial intelligence

The mythical figure of Kratt has a long history in Estonian folklore. It is found in numerous works of popular culture, such as Eduard Tubin's ballet 'Kratt' (1943) and Andrus Kivirähk's novel 'Rehepapp ehk November' (2000). Kratts usually refer to creatures made of household objects and that do what their masters ask but become difficult to manage when no task is

assigned to them. In recent years, Kratt was used in Estonia as a metaphor for artificial intelligence (AI). This image intended to ease communication on the subject and to convey the idea that AI should be used with caution. In this talk, we address the development of the figure of Kratt from several standpoints. First, we investigate the origins of Kratt and its variations in Estonian mythology and literature. Second, we consider its place within a set of similar mythical creatures, notably the Golem, used to convey ideas in the ethics of technology. Finally, we discuss the images suggested by the metaphor of AI as Kratt.

Edit Talpsepp

University of Tartu

The problems with defining death via the concept of irreversibility

Death is commonly defined as the irreversible cessation of the biological functions that sustain a living organism. Consequently, the notion of irreversibility has long been central to ethical, philosophical, and conceptual discussions of death. This paper argues that the concept of irreversibility is historically contingent and increasingly problematic as a foundational criterion for defining death.

First, irreversibility depends on how we conceptualize organisms. While it may apply relatively clearly to unitary organisms, it becomes ambiguous in modular or colonial organisms whose components can survive the death of the larger whole and even generate new organisms.

Second, determining irreversibility is an epistemic challenge: organisms that appear dead may retain latent life potential, as in cases of dormancy, raising the possibility that judgments of irreversible death reflect the limits of observation rather than biological reality.

Third, irreversibility is technologically contingent. Advances in resuscitation and medical technology have already shifted human death criteria from cardiac to brain death and may further transform them in the future.

Finally, emerging developments in artificial life, synthetic biology, and digital existence may reshape the relationship between life and death itself.

Conclusion: death should therefore be understood not as an absolute natural boundary but as a context-dependent stage within ongoing biological and technological processes.

Endel Talvik

Psühhoanalüütik, erapraksis

Induktiivse loogika võimalusi

Henri Bergson käsitleb teoses "Essee teadvuse vahetutest andmetest" probleemi üksiku ja üldise suhtest. Ta märgib, et iga arv on ühtaegu ühikute hulk ja samas ka eraldi ühik. Näiteks arv 3 võib olla moodustatud 1+1+1 või muude kombinatsioonide kaudu. Sellest jõuab Bergson oma durée ehk kestvuse mõisteni, näidates, et arvud ei ole pelgalt abstraktsed objektid, vaid ilmnevad teadvuse ajalises voolus.

Bergson räägib seega korruga nii konkreetsetest arvudest kui ka arvu ideest ehk arvu representatsioonist inimese teadvuses. Konkreetsed arvud on üks, kuid teadvuses võib ta seostuda mitme kujuga. Sama kehtib ka teiste mõistete kohta: näiteks „ema“ tähistab konkreetset inimest, kuid representatsioonina võib see hõlmata erinevaid kogemusi, mälestusi ja tähendusi.

Representatsioone aitab Alfred Korzybski metafoor: „kaart ei ole territoorium ja sõna ei ole asi“. Metafoor rõhutab vajadust eristada reaalsust ja selle representatsioone. Konkreetsed objekte maailmas on üks, kuid teadvuses eksisteerib ta representatsioonina, mis on seotud paljude teiste kujutluste ja seostega. Representatsioon ei ole objekti koopia, vaid assotsiatiivses väljas organiseeruv kognitiivne struktuur, „kaart“ objekti kohta, mis on mitmetähenduslik.

Sellises representatsioonide võrgustikus ei toimi mõtlemine üksnes deduktiivselt, vaid ka induktiivselt ja assotsiatiivselt. Kavatsen rääkida, kuidas representatsioonid peas organiseeruvad ja kuidas *representatsioonide sees* opereerib induktiivne loogika, luues mitmetähenduslikke olukordi ja võimaldades metafoorilist mõtlemist.

Marco Tassella

Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia

Moral AI and Moral Upskilling – The Procedural Artificial Moral Assistant

This talk suggests a procedural shift in debates on Moral AI by arguing that AI systems should support, rather than replace, human moral agency. While much discussion has focused on the possibility of autonomous Artificial Moral Agents capable of making or recommending moral decisions¹³, my proposal advances an alternative paradigm: AI as a moral assistant aimed at strengthening human deliberative capacities, to enhance users' autonomy by supporting their moral-deliberative skills and processes. Building on the concepts of moral expertise¹⁴ and procedural-epistemic moral enhancement¹⁵, the talk introduces the idea of a Procedural Artificial Moral Assistant (PAMA). Instead of delivering moral verdicts, such systems would scaffold reflective reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. By helping users articulate, scrutinize, and revise their reasons, a procedural assistant can cultivate the skills

¹³ Savulescu, J. and Maslen, H. (2015) 'Moral Enhancement and Artificial Intelligence: Moral AI?', in J. Romportl, E. Zackova, and J. Kelemen (eds) *Beyond Artificial Intelligence*. Cham: Springer International Publishing (Topics in Intelligent Engineering and Informatics), pp. 79–95.

¹⁴ Rawls, J. (1951) 'Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics', *The Philosophical Review*, 60(2), p. 177.

¹⁵ Schaefer, G.O. and Savulescu, J. (2019) 'Procedural Moral Enhancement', *Neuroethics*, 12(1), pp. 73–84.

that characterize competent moral judgment: conceptual clarity, bias awareness, openness to revision, and sensitivity to competing considerations. This approach contrasts with dominant models of moral AI centered on substitution, advice, or purely dialogical interaction¹⁶. By focusing on procedural support rather than outcome optimization, the assistant paradigm aims to avoid risks of moral deskilling and paternalism while preserving human authorship and responsibility¹⁷. Moral AI is thus reframed not as a replacement for moral agency, but as a tool for its development and exercise.

Carlos M. Suarez Tavernier

University of St Andrews

Kant and the Crisis of Male Friendship

This paper explores Kant's conception of friendship as a philosophical response to the modern crisis of male friendship. It examines his distinction between friendships of need, taste, and morality, focusing on the latter as the union of mutual love and respect. While Kant's account is often criticised as demanding, impractical, and idealistic, it nonetheless provides valuable ethical clarity for understanding and cultivating genuine friendship. By linking Kant's insights to the contemporary friendship crisis, the paper argues that his framework offers practical guidance for building meaningful and balanced relationships today.

Uku Tooming

Filosoofia ja Semiootika Instituut, Tartu Ülikool

Tõrgetest surma kujutlemisel

Filosoofilises esteetikas on palju arutletud nn kujutlustõrke fenomeni üle. Esmakordselt märkas seda Hume, kuid üksikasjalikumalt uuriti seda palju hiljem. See nähtus viitab meie näilisele suutmatusele või tahtmatusele kujutleda fiktsionaalse tõena teatavaid propositsioone, kuigi me üldiselt suudame kergesti kujutleda ja fiktsionaalse tõena võtta fantastilisi või uskumatuid asju, mida me päriselus kunagi tõeks ei võtaks. Sarnane kujutluslik tõrge tekib siis, kui inimene üritab ette kujutada oma surma. Täpsemalt, siin on vähemalt kahte laadi tõrget. Esiteks on tõrge selle kujutlemise vastu, et ühel päeval olen ma surnud. Teiseks on tõrge enda surnuna kujutlemise vastu, mis välistab igasuguse vaatepunkti, millest seda kogeda saaks. Väidan, et tõrge oma surma kujutlemise vastu esindab standardse kujutusliku tõrke

¹⁶ Szutta, A. (2025). Artificial intelligence as a moral mentor. *Journal of Moral Education*, 1–19.

¹⁷ Vallor, S. (2015) 'Moral Deskilling and Upskilling in a New Machine Age: Reflections on the Ambiguous Future of Character', *Philosophy & Technology*, 28(1), pp. 107–124.

pöördvormi. Standardse tõrke puhul ei ole isik valmis propositsiooni pelgalt fiktsionaalsena kohtlema ning kaldub seda tegelikku maailma eksportima. Oma surma kujutlemisel juhtub vastupidine: isik tõrgub selle vastu, et pidada kujuteldavat propositsiooni tegelikult tõseks, ning kaldub seda hoopis fiktsionaalsena kohtlema. Ma kutsun seda „fiktsionaliseerivaks kujutlustõrkeks“. Ettekandes võrdlen ja kontrasteerin fiktsionaliseerivat vaadet ka psühhoanalüütiliste lähenemistega surma kujutlemise tõrkele ning kognitivistlike käsitlustega, nagu Nicholisi oma, mis tugineb mina-mõiste eripäradele.

Eduardo Torres

Trinity College Dublin

“Why?” is a child’s question: Jaan Kaplinski’s Ordinary Language Philosophy

This paper approaches Jaan Kaplinski’s philosophy of language through the lens of Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP).

Kaplinski (1941–2021) was an Estonian poet, philosopher, and public intellectual who wrote extensively on language, ecology, politics, and spirituality. Meanwhile, Oxford Philosophy, or Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP), emerged as an intellectual movement within analytic philosophy from the 1930s to 1950s, exemplified in the works of Ryle, Austin, Strawson, and Grice. Later, it saw a revival in an openly Wittgensteinian key through figures like Cavell, Diamond, and Crary. OLP purports to dissolve philosophical problems by revealing how they stem from misuses and misunderstandings of our most ordinary concepts. Rather than imposing abstract definitions, OLP focuses on the actual ways we think and talk about the world to dispel *metaphysical* illusions.

Bringing Kaplinski’s reflections on language together with OLP concepts promises an illuminating examination of our meaning-making practices. In his writings about language, Kaplinski (2020) displays a remarkable animosity towards narrow theoretical constructs, as well as a vital sensitivity to how meaning emerges from and within shared, lived experiences. This attitude resonates with Cora Diamond’s (1995) notion of the *realistic spirit*: a philosophical approach that emphasises openness and attentiveness to the textures of ordinary life’s—paired naturally with a resistance to rigid theoretical frameworks. Both authors share a Wittgensteinian commitment to the priority of our living language over the metaphysical urge to reduce and contain it.

Hence, my reading offers a novel lens on Kaplinski’s philosophical thought while enriching OLP with a socio-political dimension largely absent from Wittgenstein and the Oxford founders. In the end, Kaplinski never loses sight of the fragility of a language—and the life-view it shapes—in the context of political oppression, thus adding necessary urgency and breadth to traditional Ordinary Language insights.

Marina Vahter
Tallinna Ülikool

From the Imagined to the Real and Back: How to Construct More Meaningful Utopias While Making Better Sense of Our Reality?

The paper begins from the premise that reality is not only discovered but also imaginatively produced, arguing that the questions of how to construct more meaningful utopias and how to better understand reality are inseparable: the more clearly reality can be grasped beyond its naturalised illusions, the more reflexive our utopias become, and vice versa. To address both aims, the paper proposes reverse abduction through metonymic reasoning, drawing on Laclau's distinction between metaphor and metonymy. It argues that standard abductive reasoning cannot generate genuinely new questions because it remains grounded in already naturalised forms of knowledge; reasoning forward from the present, it reaches only for the categories the present has already supplied. Reverse abduction begins instead from the utopian imaginary and works backwards, allowing imaginative experience and enhanced attention to outrun established understanding and shift focus from substances (the immediately visible properties of things) to relations, which are not immediately visible but which carry the weight of meaning. Metonymic reasoning is essential to this process: whereas metaphor operates through substitution and similarity, and therefore presupposes precisely the stable meanings under examination, metonymy traces chains of association that present themselves as inevitable, exposing their contingency and opens them to contestation.

Rokas Vaičiulis
Institute of Philosophy, Vilnius University

Human-Technology Relations: On the Difference between General and Digital Philosophy of Technology

This paper argues that the human-technology relations criterion provides sufficient conceptual grounds to distinguish between general philosophy of technology (D. Ihde, A. Feenberg) and digital philosophy of technology (L. Floridi, L. Parisi).

Furthermore, we propose the general-digital distinction as the divergence in ontological commitment: unlike the primordial concern of human-centered mediation in general philosophy of technology, philosophy of digital technology stipulates digital actors as real agents (e.g. Artificial Intelligence).

Both Ihde and Feenberg are thinkers of technological multistability: for them, there is no single, historically-fixed and culturally unified principle that would predetermine technology – same technology can instantiate different human-technology structural relations based on context and use. For Ihde, technology mediates human experience and cultural practices, while for Feenberg, technology codifies social interests and power relations. Floridi and

Parisi, on the other hand, go beyond the human-mediation framework and suggest that digital technology results ontological reconfiguration: Floridi proposes an ethics of information, where moral considerability is extended to artificial agents; while Parisi advances an ontology where both humanity and digital technology (e.g. Artificial Intelligence) function as an *alien mode of cognition* irreducible to human intentionality. Both views, I think, entail the shift from general to digital in philosophy of technology.

Marek Volt

Esteetiline valu

Ettekandes käsitletakse esteetilise valu mõistet analüütilises esteetikas. Vastata tuleb kolmele küsimusele.

- 1) Millega seletada „esteetiline valu“ vähest esinemist esteetilise perekonna mõistete hulgas („esteetiline väärtus“, „esteetiline kogemus“, „esteetiline elamus“ jms)?
- 2) Kas ja mis mõttes on „esteetiline valu“ oksüümoron?
- 3) Millised on „esteetiline valu“ levinumad tähendused? Esteetilised puudujäägid, kihi esteetilise järele, esteetiline loomevalu, esteetiliselt objektistatud valu, estetiseeritud valu vms?

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Karol Wapniarski

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge

Faculty of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Adam Mickiewicz University Poznań

& Paweł Łupkowski

Faculty of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Adam Mickiewicz University Poznań

Beyond Pragmatism: On the application of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics to discussions surrounding AI

Applying Aristotelian Virtue Ethics to discussions on AI is an underrepresented but growing trend. We use the example of the debate surrounding Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) to argue that virtue ethics is the only philosophical framework through which the current discussions on AI ethics can be satisfactorily modelled. First, we show that the ethical discussions surrounding AVs can be conceptualised as instantiating the classical “Trolley Problem” dilemma and cannot be resolved by abstract ethical considerations. Second, we demonstrate how pragmatic and deontological approaches fail, with attempts in the literature facing internal difficulties. Third, we argue that the discussion can be resolved only when a third stance is taken – that of a virtue ethics, viz. an aretaic framework. Since an aretaic approach applied to AI shifts attention from abstract considerations to the actual performance of the system, the “Moral Dilemma” does not occur. Instead, the continual improvement of algorithms becomes the most “ethical” stance. However, we propose to view virtue ethics as an “Augmented Pragmatism” – whereas pragmatism, operating on only one variable of efficiency or profit-maximization, is too narrow to accommodate for the complexity of AI and its societal implications, virtue ethics allows for more variables: explainability, social responsibility, sustainability, and others.
